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In mid-June 2011 the Institute of Policy Studies and 
Landcare Research co-hosted a symposium in Wellington 
on ‘Biophysical Limits and their Policy Implications’.1 The 
symposium addressed two interrelated sets of questions. The 
first are empirical in nature: what are the earth’s biological 
and physical (or biophysical) limits and what are the practical 
implications of these limits for humanity? For instance, is 
exponential global economic growth, as measured by GDP, 
technically possible on a planet with limited natural resources 
and waste absorption constraints, and, if so, under what 
conditions? Does ‘green’ growth, as proposed by the OECD 
(2011), offer a feasible way to circumvent or negate these 
For a world of seemingly unlimited resources, mankind is gradually accustoming 
itself to the Earth as a limited, crowded and finite space, with limited resources 
for extraction and a narrowing capacity for waste disposal of pollution. 
Jean-Claude Trichet (quoted in Jackson, 2009, p.67)
limits, and, if so, what policy changes 
will be required to enable such growth? 
Second, there are various normative issues: 
given the earth’s biophysical properties, 
how should we choose to live? In other 
words, how should the empirical reality of 
absolute constraints shape the nature of 
humanity’s goals and the means chosen to 
pursue them? Further, what ethical criteria 
and other considerations should inform 
the setting of global limits or thresholds 
– or what Rockström et al. (2009a, 2009b) 
call ‘planetary boundaries’ – within which 
humanity should endeavour to operate?
Drawing on the contributions to the 
symposium on biophysical limits, this 
article focuses on four main issues: the 
nature of the earth’s biophysical limits; 
the setting of ‘safe’ planetary boundaries; 
the implications of biophysical limits 
for economic growth; and the political 
economy issues involved in moving the 
global economy onto a ‘green’ growth 
path. But first, let me provide some 
context.
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Background
Debates about environmental limits and 
economic growth are not new. Nor are 
concerns over the capacity of this planet 
to sustain an ever-increasing human 
population. More than two centuries ago, 
in 1798, Thomas Malthus published his 
important study An Essay on the Principle 
of Population, in which he argued that the 
number of human beings would ultimately 
be limited by scarce resources, and 
especially by constrained food supplies. 
As he put it: ‘The power of population 
is indefinitely greater than the power in 
the earth to produce subsistence for man’ 
(Malthus, 1798, p.13). Thus far, Malthus 
has been wrong. The human population 
has continued to grow and the production 
of food has expanded even more rapidly 
(although significant distributional 
issues remain). But whether, and for how 
long, it will be possible to feed an ever-
rising population is uncertain. After all, 
much global food production currently 
relies upon finite non-renewable and/or 
conditionally renewable resources, as will 
be discussed shortly.
Almost two centuries after Malthus, 
Meadows et al. (1972), of MIT, argued 
in The Limits to Growth (and various 
subsequent publications eg, 1992, 2004) 
that long-term exponential economic 
growth is impossible, given the earth’s 
limited resources and constrained 
absorptive capacity. Indeed, the MIT 
team claimed that even under the most 
optimistic assumptions concerning 
technological innovation, continuing 
economic and population growth would 
eventually lead to overshoot and collapse. 
The thesis advanced by Meadows et al. 
proved to be highly controversial and 
was the subject of many sustained and 
detailed rebuttals (e.g. Cole et al., 1973). 
Such critiques – which covered a range of 
methodological, empirical and normative 
issues – led many policy makers to dismiss 
the core arguments in The Limits to 
Growth as utterly flawed and misguided. 
But in recent years opinions within 
the international policy community 
have begun to change as concerns 
over the planet’s biophysical limits 
have intensified (e.g. see OECD, 2011; 
Reynolds, 2011; UNEP, 2007; Whitehead, 
2008). In part, this revisionism has 
been prompted by growing anxiety over 
anthropogenic climate change and its 
likely negative ecological, economic, 
social and political impacts (see Garnaut, 
2008; Hansen, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Stern, 
2007, 2009, 2011). But there has also 
been mounting evidence that humanity 
is harming many other vital biophysical 
systems, living beyond the planet’s means 
(i.e. consuming or damaging at a rate 
exceeding what nature can regenerate), 
and exceeding ‘safe’ planetary limits 
(Rockström et al., 2009a, 2009b). Such 
evidence is reflected in the findings of 
numerous reports from international 
organisations, scientific academies and 
leading research institutions, as well 
as various studies updating (and to 
some degree confirming) the original 
arguments advanced by Meadows et al. 
(e.g. Randers, 2008; Turner, 2008).
To illustrate briefly: a large-scale 
project – the ‘Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment’ – sponsored by the 
United Nations and involving 1,300 
leading scientists over several years 
was completed in 2005. The authors of 
the synthesis report on Ecosystems and 
Human Well-Being observed that of the 
various ecosystem services2 examined, 
approximately 60% were ‘degraded’ or 
being ‘used unsustainably’, including fresh 
water, capture fisheries, and air and water 
purification (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). Similarly, the report 
highlighted evidence of an increasing 
‘likelihood of nonlinear changes in 
ecosystems (including accelerating, abrupt 
and potentially irreversible changes) 
that have important consequences for 
human well-being’. These include ‘abrupt 
alterations in water quality, the creation 
of “dead zones” in coastal waters, the 
collapse of fisheries, and shifts in regional 
climates’. To compound problems, genetic 
diversity is declining, as is the number of 
species on the planet. It is estimated that 
since around 1800 ‘humans have increased 
the species extinction rate by as much as 
1,000 times over background rates typical 
over the planet’s history’. Currently, up 
to 30% of mammal, bird and amphibian 
species are threatened with extinction. 
And to make matters worse, the growing 
human population, projected to reach 
at least 9 billion by 2050, is bound to 
increase pressures on already fragile 
ecosystems. As a result, the earth faces 
another great spasm of extinction – but 
this time caused by humanity, not natural 
forces (see also Sukhdev et al., 2008). 
Related to this, a team of scientists 
concluded in 2002 that humanity’s 
collective demands began to exceed 
the earth’s regenerative capacity about 
1980 (Brown, 2009, p.14). By 2009, the 
demands on natural systems exceeded 
their sustainable yield capacity by close 
to 30%. This means that human beings 
are depleting the planet’s natural assets 
and doing so at an increasing rate. Such 
trends can continue only for so long 
before negative feedback mechanisms are 
triggered, critical thresholds are crossed, 
and irreversible ecosystem damage is 
inflicted. Hence, while the relevant 
timescales are uncertain, the long-term 
implications are clear.
More recently, in May 2011 the 
OECD published a major report on 
the implications of global ecological 
considerations for economic management, 
entitled Towards Green Growth. The study 
emphasises the finite nature of this planet, 
the vital importance to human well-
being of natural capital, the huge value 
to humanity of the ecosystem services 
provided by the earth’s biosphere, and the 
need to live within certain non-negotiable 
planetary boundaries. Reports such as 
It is estimated that since around 1800 ‘humans 
have increased the species extinction rate by as 
much as 1,000 times over background rates typical 
over the planet’s history’.
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these underscore the growing awareness 
amongst senior policy makers and leading 
economists (e.g. Arrow et al., 1995, 2004) 
that humanity must take resource scarcity 
and ecological limits seriously, and do so, 
as appropriate, on multiple scales: global, 
regional and local.
Biophysical limits
Three types of biophysical limits have 
been the primary focus of attention 
in the relevant literature over recent 
decades: material or resource limits; waste 
absorption limits; and thermodynamic 
limits. Let me briefly explore each of these 
limits.
Limited resource inputs
While some natural resources are 
unconditionally renewable and essentially 
inexhaustible (e.g. sunlight, marine 
energy and wind energy), many resources 
required for human well-being are non-
renewable (at least on non-geological 
timeframes). This includes minerals (both 
metallic and non-metallic) and fossil 
fuels (e.g. oil, gas and coal). Many other 
resources are conditionally renewable: they 
regenerate at relatively slow rates and are 
limited in supply (e.g. fresh water, soil and 
wood).
With respect to non-renewable and 
conditionally renewable natural resources, 
there has been vigorous debate about the 
following matters: 
• the nature, quantity and quality of 
the reserves of the various minerals 
and fossil fuels used in production 
processes; 
• the estimated life of these reserves 
at current and projected rates of 
consumption; 
• the extent to which particular 
resources are substitutable (or likely 
to be substitutable with new and 
evolving technologies); and 
• the consequences of natural resource 
constraints for continued economic 
growth (or even sustaining current 
consumption levels). 
Optimists argue, for instance, that 
a combination of market forces (i.e. 
rationing by price), technological 
innovation and prudent policies will 
ensure that any scarcity of resource 
inputs does not seriously affect global 
economic growth, certainly during the 
21st century. By contrast, other experts 
maintain that economic growth will be 
severely constrained by limited natural 
resources well before 2100, not least 
because of limits to substitutability and 
because efficiency improvements may 
be constrained by the very nature and 
properties of the physical world. Many 
experts are also concerned about high 
levels of path dependence and inertia (e.g. 
with respect to various energy, transport 
and social systems), the potentially 
large social, economic and political 
costs involved in transitioning from one 
technological state to another (e.g. moving 
from a carbon-intensive to a low-carbon 
economy), the risks of inducing abrupt, 
non-linear and disruptive changes in the 
key biophysical systems, and the potential 
for crossing irreversible thresholds. Some 
of these matters were addressed during 
the symposium on biophysical limits (e.g. 
see Rutledge, 2011; Saunders, 2011; Turner, 
2011; Walker, 2011).
Aside from this, advocates of ‘strong 
sustainability’ (e.g. see Adams et al., 
2009) maintain that non-substitutable 
resources should not be used up 
or destroyed. It is argued that such 
resources are intrinsically valuable and/
or that ‘intergenerational justice imposes 
stewardship obligations on the current 
generation to preserve options for future 
generations’ (Hay, 2007, p.115). From this 
perspective, destroying non-substitutable 
resources (and ecosystems) is unjust 
because it violates the rights of future 
generations. Accordingly, certain resources 
(and ecosystems) should be preserved in 
perpetuity. Against this, advocates of ‘weak 
sustainability’ maintain that using up 
non-substitutable resources is acceptable, 
at least to a certain extent (although 
exactly how much is often not specified). 
Furthermore, preventing humanity from 
using resources that are potentially non-
substitutable is unrealistic, impractical 
and costly. After all, without a universally 
agreed and collectively enforced approach, 
protecting non-substitutable resources is 
impossible.
With respect to specific natural 
resources, considerable international 
attention has focused in recent years 
on the supply and demand for fossil 
fuels, and especially the issue of ‘peak 
oil’. This has included controversy over 
when oil production will peak (if it 
has not done so already), how rapidly 
production levels will fall after the peak, 
and the likely impact on energy prices 
and economic activity (see Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, 2009). 
But while oil is a crucially important 
resource, so too is fresh water. Indeed, 
not merely is water an essential input 
into many human activities, it is largely 
non-substitutable and very unevenly 
distributed. As Howard-Williams et al. 
(2011) noted at the symposium on bio-
physical limits, less than 3% of the world’s 
water is fresh, and of this less than 1% is 
accessible and readily usable by human 
beings. To compound problems, the 
global availability of fresh water per 
capita has declined markedly over the 
past 50 years and the rate of decline is 
accelerating. As a result, demand now 
exceeds supply in around 80 countries. 
Population growth and climate change 
will exacerbate matters, with severe water 
stress becoming increasingly common. 
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While New Zealand has a relative 
abundance of fresh water, its spatial 
distribution is highly uneven. Further, 
some water resources are already fully 
allocated and shortages are growing. 
Better water management is thus 
of crucial importance. Fortunately, 
this is now accepted by most, if not 
all, stakeholders, as reflected in the 
deliberations of the Land and Water 
Forum.
Adequate water supplies are, of 
course, critical for food production. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the risk of 
resource shortages having a negative 
impact on global food supplies has 
been of growing concern (see Cribb, 
2010). According to the chief scientific 
adviser to the British government, Sir 
John Beddington (2009), the global 
community faces a ‘perfect storm’ 
over food production within decades. 
Contributing factors are likely to 
include: 
• continuing population growth, 
especially in South Asia and Africa;
• a continuing loss of top soil and soil 
fertility due to poor agricultural and 
land management practices, rapid 
deforestation, desertification and 
erosion, pollution, the intensification 
of storms and droughts, etc. (Brown, 
2009, pp.32-38);
• a growing loss of agricultural 
land due to urbanisation and 
industrialisation;
• a continuing loss of wild fisheries 
due to pollution, over-exploitation, 
ocean acidification and rising sea 
temperatures. According to some 
estimates, around three-quarters of 
oceanic fisheries are being fished at 
or beyond capacity or are recovering 
from over-exploitation (Brown, 2009, 
p.15). Acidification and rising sea 
temperatures, amongst other things, 
could result in a loss of 60% of coral 
by 2030 (Sukhdev, 2008, p.9), with 
huge implications for global fish 
stocks;
• rising energy prices, due to peak oil; 
• growing shortages of fresh water 
due to the effects of climate change, 
together with falling water tables 
and the loss of once huge fossil 
aquifers (due to the excessive mining 
of underground water). Declining 
supplies of groundwater are already 
contributing to the loss of millions 
of hectares of irrigated crop land;
• the loss of insect pollinators (especially 
bees) as a result of pollution and 
the excessive use of chemicals. Note 
that the value of pollination services 
provided by insect pollinators was 
estimated at €153 billion in 2005 for 
the main crops that feed the world 
(OECD, 2011);
• shortages of fertilizer (e.g. phosphate 
reserves are likely to be exhausted 
within a century or so if consumption 
grows at 3% per annum) (see Gilbert, 
2009); 
• the limits to photosynthesis (Dia-
mond, 2005, p.491); and
• the continued diversion of crop land 
for bio-fuel production.
Obviously, any serious and 
protracted global food shortages could 
have major economic, social and 
political consequences – including 
the risk of civil disorder and violent 
conflict. If sufficiently widespread or 
destabilising, such developments are 
bound to slow economic growth, if not 
provoke a worldwide recession. Having 
said this, net food exporters, like New 
Zealand, stand to gain financially from 
such shortages (and the related price 
increases). But any such benefits need 
to seen against an otherwise potentially 
bleak global context, with severe human 
suffering. Avoiding such a scenario will 
require prudent management of key 
global resources, not least fresh water, 
soil, agricultural land and wild fisheries. 
Thus far, the track record has not been 
encouraging.
Waste absorption limits
While the planet’s natural resources are 
limited, so too are its ‘sinks’. In other 
words, the capacity of the biosphere 
to absorb or assimilate the waste and 
pollution generated by economic activity 
is constrained. Hence, even if the scarcity 
of certain resource inputs does not 
constrain economic growth and human 
activity over the foreseeable future, waste 
absorption limits may well have adverse 
consequences (see Reynolds, 2011). The 
limited capacity of the biosphere to 
absorb humanity’s increasing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, especially carbon 
dioxide (CO2), is perhaps the greatest 
single threat on the horizon. Currently, 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
are rising rapidly (at around 2.5 parts 
per million per annum); within a few 
years they will reach 400 parts per 
million (or more than 40% above pre-
industrial levels). Global mean surface 
temperatures, which have already risen 
by about 0.8°C over the past century, are 
projected to increase by at least another 
2°C by 2100, unless GHG emissions are 
substantially reduced. Such warming and 
related climate changes will have serious 
and potentially irreversible consequences, 
including substantial sea-level rise, more 
severe storms and droughts, and a massive 
loss of biodiversity. By the end of the 
century, the sea level could be as much as 
a metre higher (and possibly more). Such 
a rise will cause huge and widespread 
damage to coastal infrastructure and 
settlements (including roads, railway 
... any serious and protracted global food 
shortages could have major economic, 
social and political consequences – 
including the risk of civil disorder and 
violent conflict.
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lines and ports), and inundate many 
river deltas and low-lying islands. It is 
hard to believe that such damage could 
occur without having negative impacts 
on global economic growth, as well as 
human well-being. Despite these risks, 
few governments have implemented 
significant or effective policy measures to 
reduce GHG emissions.
Thermodynamic limits 
According to Herman Daly (1973, 2010), 
the laws of thermodynamics place an 
absolute limit on the efficiency with 
which resources can be utilised, thereby 
constraining the potential for long-
term exponential economic growth. For 
instance, in keeping with the first law, the 
production of material objects requires 
an irreducible minimum quantity of 
resources, while the second law (or the law 
of entropy) means that the same matter-
energy cannot be used repeatedly for 
similar purposes. 
But whether (and/or at what point) 
these thermodynamic limits are likely 
to affect economic activity remains 
debatable. Hay (2007, p.114) highlights 
various counter-arguments to the claimed 
constraints imposed by the first law of 
thermodynamics. First, as economies have 
grown richer, the demand for services has 
increased much faster than for products. 
Since the provision of services typically 
requires fewer material inputs, any 
constraints imposed by thermodynamic 
limits are likely to lessen over time (or at 
least be delayed). Second, there has been a 
steady increase in resource efficiency over 
recent decades, the product of continuing 
innovation and human ingenuity. Thus 
far, there has been no evidence that 
productivity improvements are slowing 
down or facing insurmountable physical 
barriers.
Regarding the second law, the concern 
is that energy is dissipated through the 
production process while, at the same 
time, natural resources are degraded. 
Ultimately, it is argued, this will limit 
economic growth. But the counter-
argument is that solar energy can be used 
to recover wastes and recycle dissipated 
materials (Hay, 2007, pp.114-5). The only 
constraint, from this perspective, is the 
amount of energy that can be captured 
from the sun. This will depend primarily 
on the level of technology – and this 
continues to expand. In short, there 
is no evidence to date that the laws of 
thermodynamics have constrained global 
economic growth or that they will do so 
in the near future. But over the longer 
term our confidence probably needs to 
be more tempered.
Establishing safe biophysical boundaries
Increasing attention has been given 
in recent years to determining ‘safe’ 
global biophysical limits (or planetary 
boundaries). The relevant literature 
is evolving, and many questions 
remain unanswered. Among the most 
comprehensive efforts to delineate such 
limits is the work of a distinguished team of 
scientists led by Johan Rockström (2009a, 
2009b). The group has identified nine 
planetary boundaries (see Table 1). These 
include atmospheric CO2 concentrations, 
extinction rates, global freshwater use, the 
quantity of phosphorus flowing into the 
oceans, and so forth. Their analysis suggests 
that humanity is already transgressing at 
least three of these boundaries (i.e. with 
respect to climate change, the rate of 
biodiversity loss and changes to the global 
nitrogen cycle). As one might expect, the 
proposed parameters have prompted 
vigorous debate (e.g. Schlesinger, 2009). 
After all, determining what is safe is not 
just a scientific exercise. It also involves 
ethical judgements, some of which are 
profoundly difficult. For instance:
• How much harm, and of what kind, 
is morally acceptable? To be more 
specific, how many species should we 
be prepared to sacrifice on the altar of 
human ‘progress’?
• What risks should we be willing to 
tolerate? For example, should we be 
prepared to take the risk of inducing 
the irreversible melting of a major ice 
sheet, such as the Greenland or the 
West Antarctic ice sheet – with the 
prospect, eventually, of a multi-metre 
sea-level rise?
• What costs should we be willing to 
bear in order to protect the interests 
of future generations and preserve 
non-human species? 
• What safety margin should we 
incorporate into any internationally 
agreed limits or thresholds in order 
to reduce the chances of abrupt, non-
linear changes, other unexpected 
outcomes, and wider systemic risks?
Such questions are not amenable 
to simple answers. Yet they deserve 
our urgent attention. After all, the best 
available evidence suggests that if we 
persevere with existing policy settings 
we will face mounting environmental 
problems and run very serious risks. 
While the topic of planetary boundaries 
was briefly canvassed at the Wellington 
symposium, it needs much more 
sustained, rigorous and interdisciplinary 
analysis.
Biophysical limits and economic growth
Thus far I have briefly discussed the nature 
of the earth’s limited resources and sinks, 
and their implications for human activities. 
As will be evident, there is no consensus on 
whether long-term exponential economic 
growth is technically feasible. Many 
experts are sceptical. As the distinguished 
economist Lord Stern (2009, p.10) has put 
it: ‘A picture of indefinite expansion is an 
implausible story of the future.’ 
 ... if continuing global growth is feasible 
... it seems reasonable to conclude that 
such an outcome will be possible only if 
human activities are utterly consistent 
with the assimilative and regenerative 
capacities of the earth’s biosphere.
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But if continuing global growth is 
feasible at least, say, over the 21st century, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that 
such an outcome will be possible only 
if human activities are utterly consistent 
with the assimilative and regenerative 
capacities of the earth’s biosphere. Above 
all, this means that growth must be 
decoupled from its negative ecological 
impacts and physical (or resource) 
throughputs. Where such impacts or 
resource use already exceed safe and 
sustainable parameters, such decoupling 
must occur in absolute, not just relative, 
terms. In other words, there must be an 
absolute reduction in environmental 
pressures per unit of output (e.g. GHG 
emissions or carbon intensity per unit 
of output), not merely improvements in 
ecological impacts and/or resource use 
per unit of output.3 Relative reductions 
will not be enough, certainly if overall 
output is increasing more rapidly than 
the improvements in resource efficiency 
or environmental impact per unit of 
output. As Jackson (2009, p.71) explains, 
for absolute decoupling to occur, the 
rate of relative decoupling must exceed 
the rate of increase in overall output (or 
GDP). 
Moreover, to sustain growth over 
lengthy time periods, ever more extensive 
absolute decoupling will be required 
(i.e. across an ever wider range of 
environmental impacts). In practical 
terms, this means that the current carbon-
intensive and resource-intensive global 
economy must be transformed through 
the application of resource-conserving 
technologies into one characterised by 
low resource intensity and minimal 
environmental impacts. Such an 
economy will need to reuse or recycle 
virtually all its natural resource inputs; 
rely primarily, if not solely, on renewable 
sources of energy; preserve critical (or 
non-substitutable) natural capital; and 
ensure that all forms of pollution and 
other environmental impacts – including 
GHG emissions – remain within safe 
biophysical limits. 
Both the scale and rate of the 
decoupling required over the next few 
decades it vastly greater than anything so 
far achieved in human history. It will entail 
much more than is currently envisaged 
in the sustainable development strategies 
which various countries have enunciated 
(e.g. see Frame and Bebbington, 2011). 
And the changes must be global in nature, 
not limited to a subset of jurisdictions.4
Take, for instance, atmospheric CO2 
concentrations: as noted earlier, these 
are now close to 400 parts per million, 
or nearly 50 parts per million above 
what Rockström et al. (2009a, 2009b) 
and Hansen et al. (2008) regard as ‘safe’ 
(or at least low enough to minimise the 
risk of large-scale, abrupt and irreversible 
environmental damage). Yet to stabilise 
CO2 concentrations at 350 parts per 
million (or even close to this level) 
will require massive cuts in emissions 
(especially, but not solely, in the developed 
world). In fact, negative net emissions 
globally will ultimately be necessary 
for a protracted period. This will not 
be possible without a dramatic fall in 
the carbon intensity of world output. 
Whether such reductions are achievable 
is open to debate. Many experts are 
sceptical, for either technical or political 
reasons. Jackson (2009) highlights the 
daunting nature of the challenge:
1. Global carbon intensity declined 
by almost a quarter from just over 1 
Table 1: Planetary boundaries
Earth-system process Parameters Proposed 
boundary
Current 
Status
Pre-
industrial 
value
Climate Change (i) Atmosphere carbon dioxide 
concentration (parts per million by 
volume)
350 387 280
(ii) Change in radiative forcing (watts 
per metre squared)
1 1.5 0
Rates of biodiversity loss Extinction rate (number of species per 
million species per year)
10 >100 0.1-1
Nitrogen cycle (part of 
a boundary with the 
phosphorus cycle)
Amount of N2 removed from the 
atmosphere for human use (millions of 
tonnes per year)
35 121 0
Phosphorus cycle (part of a 
boundary with the nitrogen 
cycle)
Quantity of P flowing in oceans 
(millions of tonnes per year)
11 8.5-9.5 -1
Stratospheric ozone depletion Concentration of ozone (Dobson unit) 276 283 290
Ocean acidification Global mean saturation state of 
aragonite in surface sea water
2.75 2.90 3.44
Global freshwater use Consumption of freshwater by humans 
(km3 per year)
4,000 2,600 415
Change in land use Percentage of global land cover 
converted to cropland
15 11.7 Low
Atmospheric aerosol loading Overall particulate concerntration in 
the atmoshphere on a regional basis
To be determined
Chemical pollution For example, amount emitted to, or 
concentration of persistent organic 
pollutants, plastics, endocrine 
disrupters, heavy metals and nuclear 
waste in, the global environment, 
or the effects on ecosystem and 
functioning of Earth system
To be determined
Boundaries for processes in light blue have been crossed
Source: Rockström et al., 2009b, p.473
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kilogram of carbon dioxide per $US 
in 1980 to 770 grams per $US in 2006 
(p.69). But while carbon intensity 
has declined on average by 0.7% per 
year since 1990, the global population 
has increased by 1.3% per annum 
and average per capita income has 
increased by 1.4% (in real terms) per 
annum. As a result, there has been a 
net increase of 2% per annum in CO2 
emissions (p.79).
2. To meet an atmospheric stabilisation 
target of 450 parts per million (for 
CO2), annual emissions need to be 
reduced at an average rate of 4.9% 
per year until 2050. Given population 
growth (of about 0.7% per annum) 
and income growth (of about 1.4% per 
annum), this requires a technological 
(or carbon-intensity) improvement of 
7% per annum: this is ten times faster 
than the current rate of improvement. 
Put differently, by 2050 the average 
carbon content of economic output 
will need to be less than 40g of CO2 
per $ of output, a 21-fold improvement 
on the current global average.
3. Achieving an even lower, and safer, 
stabilisation target for CO2, such as 
350 parts per million, would be even 
more demanding.
Overall, then, the challenges ahead are 
formidable, not least because the global 
economy is characterised by substantial 
path dependence (e.g. due to the long 
lifetime of most physical infrastructure, 
including carbon-intensive energy 
systems). Moreover, continuing economic 
growth will make it harder to achieve the 
emissions reductions required to stabilise 
CO2 concentrations. Yet without growth, 
moving to a safe concentration level will 
also be hard. This is because a dynamic 
and flexible global economy is needed 
if low-carbon technologies are to be 
developed and adopted on the scale and 
with the speed required. Quite apart from 
this, low or zero global growth will lock 
large numbers of people into absolute 
poverty (i.e. unless there is a considerable 
redistribution of income and wealth 
between developed and developing 
countries and within the developing 
world).
Plainly, our capacity to decouple 
growth from environmental impacts will 
depend significantly on innovation and 
related technological advances. As the 
OECD (2011, p.10) has argued:
Existing production technology 
and consumer behavior can only 
be expected to produce positive 
outcomes up to a point; a frontier, 
beyond which depleting natural 
capital has negative consequences 
for overall growth. We do not know 
where this frontier lies in all cases 
but we do know that the ability of 
reproducible capital to substitute for 
(depleted) natural capital is limited in 
the absence of innovation. By pushing 
the frontier forward, innovation can 
help to decouple growth from natural 
capital depletion.
But developing and implementing new 
technologies and achieving the necessary 
improvements in the management of the 
planet’s natural resources will require 
major policy changes. To quote the OECD 
again:
A green growth strategy is centred 
on mutually reinforcing aspects of 
economic and environmental policy. 
It takes into account the full value 
of natural capital as a factor of 
production and its role in growth. 
It focuses on cost-effective ways of 
attenuating environmental pressures 
to effect a transition towards new 
patterns of growth that will avoid 
crossing critical local, regional and 
global environmental thresholds … 
It is about fostering economic growth 
and development while ensuring that 
natural assets continue to provide the 
resources and environmental services 
on which our well-being relies (ibid., 
pp.10, 18).
The central feature of a green 
growth framework … is recognition 
of natural capital as a factor of 
production and its role in enhancing 
well-being. … Natural capital 
contributes to production by providing 
crucial inputs, some of which are 
renewable and others which are not. 
It also influences individual and social 
welfare in various ways, through the 
effect that the environment has on 
health, through amenity value and 
through the provision of ecosystem 
services … the contribution of 
natural capital to production is often 
not priced and the contribution of 
natural capital to individual welfare is 
not appropriately valued. (pp.20, 23) 
Greening growth will require 
much more efficient use of resources 
to minimise environmental 
pressures. Efficient resource use 
and management is a core goal of 
economic policy and many fiscal and 
regulatory interventions that are not 
normally associated with a ‘green’ 
agenda will be involved. And in every 
case, policy action requires looking 
across a very wide range of policies, 
not just traditional ‘green’ policies 
(p.10).
The report goes on to outline in detail 
the kinds of policies needed to ensure that 
natural capital and ecosystem services are 
properly managed. In brief, such policies 
include:
• the proper pricing of pollution and 
the use of natural resources (e.g. via 
... developing and implementing new 
technologies and achieving the necessary 
improvements in the management of the 
planet’s natural resources will require 
major policy changes.
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taxes and tradable permits) in order 
to internalise negative environmental 
externalities, minimise the over-
exploitation of scarce natural capital 
and ensure that the true value of 
ecosystem services is reflected in 
decision-making frameworks;
• better regulatory standards to 
minimise ecological damage and 
enhance economic efficiency;
• the removal of subsidies that 
encourage pollution and the excessive 
extraction of natural resources; 
• a new regime of metrics for measuring 
economic, social and environmental 
progress (see Stiglitz et al., 2009); and
• financial compensation for the least 
advantaged groups in society so that 
the distributional consequences of 
change are minimised.
Failure to implement such policies 
will almost certainly reduce incentives 
for business to invest in low-carbon 
technologies and new ways of using 
natural resources more efficiently. It will 
also undermine efforts to shift patterns of 
public investment (especially with respect 
to transport and energy infrastructure). 
And without a massive shift in private 
and public investment (and hence in 
production and consumption patterns), it 
is highly likely that an increasing number 
of ‘safe’ biophysical boundaries will be 
crossed (locally, nationally and globally). 
Eventually, the negative biophysical 
feedbacks from such overshooting will 
undermine global economic growth, if 
not generate a major economic crash.
But while it is easy to itemise 
the policies required for greater 
environmental (and hence economic) 
sustainability, most of the policies in 
question pose significant technical and 
design challenges. For example:
• What criteria should we use to 
determine the appropriate quality 
standards for water, air and soils, 
and how should these standards be 
enforced?
• How should we value natural capital 
and ecosystem services? For instance, 
in addition to the value derived from 
the direct and indirect uses of such 
capital, what weight should be given 
to non-use values (such as ‘existence’ 
values)?
• How should we determine the 
appropriate amount to charge 
polluters? For instance, with respect 
to climate change, how should we 
decide the monetary value of the 
environmental damage caused by 
rising concentrations of GHGs, and 
hence the cost that polluters should 
pay for each unit of emissions?
• What approach should be adopted 
when there is inadequate information 
about the natural rate of regeneration 
(of various kinds of natural capital) 
or the assimilative capacity of local 
ecosystems?
• What new metrics for assessing 
environmental and social progress 
are required? And by what yardsticks 
should we measure and assess 
economic performance?
• In the case of global public goods (or 
common-pool resources), effective 
policy interventions to protect such 
goods will require international 
cooperation and collaboration. But 
how is this to be achieved? How are 
the required governance arrangements 
to be constructed?
There is, of course, no lack of 
thoughtful answers to such questions. And 
during the symposium on biophysical 
limits a variety of ideas, approaches and 
governance models were advanced (e.g. 
Dinica, 2011). Reference was also made 
to local and international examples of 
good practice with regard to sustainable 
resource management (e.g. Reynolds, 
2011). Equally, however, it is evident that 
current policy frameworks and governance 
arrangements are not adequate to address 
the magnitude, range and urgency of the 
biophysical constraints facing humanity. 
Much needs to be done, not least to 
enhance public understanding of the 
nature of the problems confronting policy 
makers and build consensus amongst key 
stakeholders on cost-effective policies for 
delivering green growth.
The political feasibility of sustainability
This takes us to the heart of the matter: 
what is politically possible and will it 
enable global sustainability? It is here that 
much pessimism abounds. A common 
theme in the relevant literature and during 
the symposium was that the main barriers 
to adopting sustainable policies are 
political and institutional, not technical. 
Put bluntly, we have the means, but not 
the will.
Politically, the capacity to implement 
fundamental policy shifts is limited by 
institutional resistance (particularly 
from powerful vested interests), global 
coordination problems and weak 
international institutions, and human 
myopia and self-interest. These political 
constraints are most evident in the 
faltering efforts to ensure the sustainable 
management of our global common-
pool resources, especially the atmosphere 
and oceans. Governance issues of this 
nature were the focus of several of the 
presentations at the symposium (Dinica, 
2011; Hatfield-Dodds, 2011; McGinnis, 
2011; Reynolds, 2011; Walker, 2011)
With respect to climate change, 
for example, policies to reduce GHG 
emissions have been thwarted or diluted 
across most of the democratic world 
because of four politically salient and 
deeply entrenched asymmetries (Boston 
and Lempp, 2011). First, there is a voting 
asymmetry: future generations, unlike 
A common theme in the relevant literature ...  
was that the main barriers to adopting  
sustainable policies are political and institutional, 
not technical. Put bluntly, we have the means,  
but not the will.
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current generations, do not have a vote, 
yet their interests are profoundly affected 
by the decisions being taken currently. 
Second, there is a cost-benefit asymmetry: 
the costs of action to reduce GHG 
emissions are certain, visible, direct and 
immediate, whereas the benefits of such 
action are less certain, intangible, indirect 
and long-term. Third, reducing emissions 
will impose significant costs on powerful, 
concentrated interests (e.g. the fossil fuel 
industry). By contrast, the beneficiaries 
of such measures are dispersed over 
time and space, and have much less 
incentive to organise to protect their 
interests. Finally, as noted earlier, there is 
an accounting asymmetry: for firms and 
governments the loss of financial assets 
counts, the loss of natural capital does 
not. For such reasons, policy measures 
that make sense in environmental terms, 
and indeed also economically on a long-
term basis, are extremely difficult to 
implement. Moreover, there are no simple 
or easy solutions to the four asymmetries 
identified above. If there were, we would 
surely have discovered them by now.
Such considerations lead to a 
further troubling question: will modern 
civilisation destroy itself? After all, 
previous civilisations have mismanaged 
their environments and suffered 
dire consequences – the Sumerians, 
Babylonians and Mayans, to name 
but a few (Brown, 2009; Diamond, 
2005). The main difference is that these 
civilisations had much less knowledge 
about the consequences of their actions 
than we do today. But knowledge is one 
thing; a willingness to act prudently is 
quite another. Thus, as Brian Walker 
(2011) observed at the symposium on 
biophysical limits: ‘we lack the necessary, 
effective global governance to allow 
our unprecedented information and 
technology to provide, in time, a solution 
to the global sustainability crisis … There 
is a grave danger of a long nightfall if we 
fail – climate change, disease, famine, 
migration and state failure have together 
triggered long dark ages in the past; all 
five are now active’. Similarly, to quote 
Daniel Rutledge (2011): ‘We can choose 
to acknowledge limits and change our 
systems (institutions, values) accordingly 
and thus avoid undesirable outcomes 
(collapse). Or not … The Limits to Growth 
and more recent research on many topics 
convey a common message: the longer we 
delay action the less likelihood we have of 
achieving desirable future outcomes due 
to inertia in the global system.’
Conclusion
In summary, the evidence suggests that 
maintaining global economic growth over 
an extended period of time will only be 
possible under very strict conditions; 
above all, the resilience of vital ecosystem 
services and biophysical systems must 
be protected. Currently, these conditions 
are not being met: collectively, humanity 
is overshooting critical biophysical 
parameters (on multiple scales) and 
seriously degrading ecosystems on a 
planetary-wide basis. This can continue 
only for so long. Eventually, the negative 
impacts will overwhelm our capacity 
to cope, and de-growth will become 
inevitable. The resulting social and 
political tensions will be immense – and 
probably unmanageable. As Paul Hawken 
has put it: ‘At present we are stealing the 
future, selling it in the present, and calling 
it gross domestic product. We can just as 
easily have an economy that is based on 
healing the future instead of stealing it. We 
can either create assets for the future or 
take the assets of the future. One is called 
restoration and the other exploitation’ 
(quoted in Brown, 2009, p.15).
A critical challenge over the coming 
decades will be not only to deepen 
our understanding of the biophysical 
properties and limits within which 
humanity must live, but also to design and 
implement new governance arrangements 
to ensure that these limits are respected 
and any overshooting is minimised. This 
will require a concerted effort to learn 
from our experience with existing policy 
models and frameworks and then apply 
this learning with wisdom and skill. But 
new approaches will also be needed, 
especially if the crucial global collective 
action problems – like climate change 
and the protection of marine ecosystems 
– are to be addressed effectively and 
expeditiously. This will require an 
unprecedented level of international 
cooperation and solidarity. Is this a 
realistic possibility? Let us hope so.
1 I would like to thank Valentina Dinica, Bob Frame, Daniel 
Rutledge and Simon Smelt for their helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this article, and Clare Hammond for the 
energetic assistance she provided over the summer months 
of 2010–11 in researching some of the issues addressed 
during the symposium.
2 There are four main kinds of ‘ecosystem services’: 
provisioning services (e.g. the production of energy, food, 
water and life-saving drugs); regulating services (e.g. 
water purification, pest and disease control, and climate 
regulation); supporting services (e.g. seed dispersal); and 
cultural services (e.g. recreational and spiritual benefits). 
3 For non-renewable resources, absolute decoupling will be 
essential eventually, whether desired or otherwise.
4 This point is important because in recent decades many 
developed countries have reduced their energy consumption 
(and carbon intensity) per unit of output, but much of this 
reduction has been the result of ‘the outsourcing of heavy 
industrial activity to emerging economies’, especially China 
(IIER, 2011). As a result, there are now large embedded 
energy transfers occurring from developing to developed 
economies.
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